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Abstract
Most decision problems can be understood as a mapping from a prefer-
ence space into a set of outcomes. When preferences are representable via
utility functions, this generates a mapping from a space of utility functions
into outcomes. We say a model is continuous in utilities (resp., preferences)
if small perturbations of utility functions (resp., preferences) generate small
changes in outcomes. While similar, these two concepts are equivalent only
when the topology satisfies the following universal property: for each contin-
uous mapping from preferences to outcomes there is a unique mapping from
utilities to outcomes that is faithful to the preference map and is continu-
ous. The topologies that satisfy such a universal property are called final
topologies. In this paper we analyze the properties of the final topology for
preference sets. This is of practical importance since most of the analysis
on continuity is done via utility functions and not the primitive preference
space. Our results allow the researcher to extrapolate continuity in utility
to continuity in the underlying preferences.
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1 Introduction
Consider the following results about a decision maker with Constant Elasticity
of Substitution (CES) preferences. As the elasticity of substitution approaches
zero, the CES function approaches a Leontief utility function. Likewise, as the
elasticity of substitution approaches unity, the CES utility function approaches a
Cobb-Douglas utility function. Formally, the CES function is given by
Upx1, x2; ρq “ pαx
´ρ
1
` p1´ αqx´ρ
2
q´
1
ρ ,
σ “
1
1` ρ
,
where σ is the elasticity of substitution and px1, x2q P R
2. Then, we have the
following limits:
Upx1, x2; ρq Ñ mintαx1, p1´ αqx2u, as ρÑ8
Upx1, x2; ρq Ñ x
α
1
x1´α
2
, as ρÑ 0.
It is natural to interpret these results in the following manner. As the elasticity
of substitution converges to unity, the decision maker’s preferences approach the
preferences of a Cobb-Douglas decision maker. Thus, any result that is true for
a Cobb-Douglas decision maker should be approximately true for a CES decision
maker with σ « 1. For instance, a Cobb-Douglas consumer spends a constant
fraction of his total expenditure on good 1 and spends the rest on good 2; thus,
one expects a CES decision maker with σ « 1 to approximately satisfy the same
property. Similarly, a Leontief consumer consumes a bundle that is insensitive to
Leontief-compensated price changes; we therefore expect a CES consumer with
σ « 0 to approximately satisfy the same property.
For such an interpretation to be valid, two conditions about the topology with
which we endow the preference space must be satisfied. First, the representation
mapping—that is, the mapping that associates each utility function with the pref-
erence it represents—must be continuous. Hence, when two utility functions are
close, so are the preferences they represent. Second, the topology on the prefer-
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ence space must preserve the continuous mappings to the space of the demand
functions; indeed, we must guarantee that if the mapping from utilities to de-
mand functions is continuous, then so is the mapping from preferences to demand
functions. Moreover, if we want to claim that any result that is true about Cobb-
Douglas decision makers will be approximately true for a CES decision maker with
σ « 1, then we need to preserve all continuous mappings from the utility space to
any outcome space, not only the space of the demand functions.
In this paper, we characterize the topology on preference spaces that is defined
by the two properties above; such a topology is called the final topology on pref-
erences. The final topology on preferences can be represented by the diagram
in Figure 1. Consider any outcome space of interest—for example, the space of
Marshall/Hicks demand functions, indirect utility/expenditure functions, best re-
sponse strategies in a game, etc.— and function g from preferences to the outcome
space of interest. The final topology satisfies that g is continuous if and only if
there exists a unique continuous function, h, such that the diagram commutes;
that is, hpuq “ pg ˝ F qpuq for all utility functions u. What this guarantees is that
the preference space preserves the structure of continuous mappings from util-
ity functions to the economic space of interest (demand functions, indirect utility
functions, best responses in games, etc.). Specifically, setting the outcome space
equal to the preference space and setting function g equal to the identity function,
we find that the representation mapping, F , must be continuous.
Space Of Preferences
Space Of Utility Functions
Outcome Space
Representation Mapping, F
h
g
Figure 1: The final topology on the preference space makes the diagram commute and
preserves all continuous mappings.
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In this framework, we provide three theorems that relate substantive economic
assumptions a researcher can impose on preference spaces to the topological prop-
erties of the preference space.
Theorem 1 shows that when no restrictions are imposed on the preference space,
this topology is the trivial topology: the only open sets are the empty set and
the full space. The driving force behind this results is that total indifference,
i.e., the preference where no alternative is strictly preferred to another, is part
of the preference space. Since total indifference is a preference that generates
uninteresting economic predictions, it is customary to exclude it from the set
of admissible preferences; in our case, this rules out the trivial topology as a
characterization of the final topology.
Theorem 2 shows that if we focus on all preferences except total indifference,
then the final topology is not trivial, it is path-connected, but it is not Hausdorff.
By path-connected, we mean that given any two preferences, either one can be
continuously distorted into the other; by Hausdorff, we mean that for any two
distinct preferences, there is a neighborhood of the first and a neighborhood of the
second such that these two neighborhoods are disjoint. While path-connectedness
is an appealing property, failing the Hausdorff property is an unappealing property
of the final topology (see Subsections 1.1 and 1.2 for discussions on the economic
implications of these properties). What prevents the space from being Hausdorff
is the presence of non-singleton indifference curves.
Theorem 3 characterizes the final topology for the space of strict preferences,
that is, preferences where no two points are indifferent. We show that the space
of strict preferences is a Hausdorff space that is totally path-disconnected. More-
over, proposition 1 shows that the set of strict preferences is the largest set that
is both Hausdorff and includes all strict preferences. This result indicates that
path-connectedness and the Hausdorff property are mutually exclusive properties
for preferences spaces, and they hold (or fail) depending on whether we allow indif-
ferences. Therefore, assumptions on indifference curves have topological meaning.
As such, the topological properties of preference spaces are not a mere technicality
but carry substantial economic meaning and methodological restrictions.
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Importantly, throughout this paper, we do not impose any topology on the space
of alternatives. Sections 2 and 5 discuss why it might be desirable to conduct this
exercise without assuming a specific topology on the space of alternatives. How-
ever, as discussed in Section 2, all the work performed on topologies for preference
spaces impose topological assumptions on the space of alternatives. Hence, Sec-
tion 5 characterizes the final topology on preferences when we impose topological
assumptions on the space of alternatives. Comparing the final topology on prefer-
ences when we do and do not impose a topology on alternatives highlights the role
that topological assumptions on the preference space play in shaping the topology
of preferences.
In short, the paper has two main takeaways. First, there is a nontrivial trade-off
between methodological generality and intuitive properties of the preference space.
Allowing for indifference in the space of preferences is natural but leads to a pref-
erence space that is not Hausdorff. However, recovering the Hausdorff property
comes at the cost of restricting attention to strict preferences only and losing path-
connectedness. Thus, there is a fundamental trade-off between methodological
generality, the intuitive properties of the topology on preferences, and the struc-
ture of indifference curves. Second, by comparing the topology on preferences both
when we do and do not impose topological assumptions on the alternative space
sheds light on how the topologies on alternatives impact the topologies on prefer-
ences. A discussion of why one might, or might not, want to impose a topology
on the preference space is delayed until Sections 2 and 5.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sections 1.1 and 1.2 discuss
why the Hausdorff property and path connectedness are appealing properties for
a preference space. Section 2 discusses our exercise in the context of the related
literature. Section 3 presents the model, and Section 4 shows our main results.
Section 5 extends the model to allow for topologies on the set of alternatives.
1.1 On the importance of the Hausdorff property
Failure of the Hausdorff property means that a constant sequence of decisions
admits a limit point that is different from the constant decision itself. This is an
unnatural property that we wish our model to avoid: in general, if we observe a
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sequence of constant decisions and we ask ourselves what is the limiting decision,
it should only be the constant decision itself.
To illustrate the importance of the Hausdorff property, suppose that we line up
a sequence of consumers deciding their demand functions, all of whom have the
same preferences, ą. Then, all these consumers have the same demand function,
D. For instance, all consumers could be Cobb-Douglas and D “ pαp1
w
x1,
p1´αqp2
w
x2q,
where w is wealth and pp1, p2q is the price vector.
If the Hausdorff property fails, then the sequence pą,ą,ą, ...q has some ąˆ as
a limit point, where ąˆ is different from ą. Furthermore, ąˆ has as a demand
function Dˆ that is different from D. As a consequence, the sequence of demand
functions pD,D,D, ...q has Dˆ as a limit point, thus violating the intuitive rule that
a sequence of constant decisions should converge only to the decision itself.
1.2 On the importance of path-connectedness.
A model’s continuity in utilities (or preference) is intimately tied to a comparative
statics question: if a decision maker’s preference was to change slightly, would his
decisions change drastically? However, in order to ask this question, slight changes
to a decision maker’s preference must exist. A corollary of Theorem 3 is that the
space of strict preferences is totally path-disconnected. Hence, each singleton is
an open set, so no such thing as a “slight” change to a consumer’s preference is
possible.
Another way to see this result is to consider the following related question.
Assume we consider two distinct preferences, ąA and ąB, and suppose that under
preference ąA the model outputs prediction zpąAq, whereas under preference ąB,
the model outputs prediction zpąBq. If we continuously change preference ąA into
preference ąB, is it true that the model’s outcome continuously changes from zpąA
q to zpąBq? This is the basis for homotopy-based comparative statics exercises
(see Shiomura [9], Borkovsky [2], or Eaves and Schmedders [6] for applications).
However, in order to conduct this exercise, we need the space of preferences to be
path-connected. Hence, losing path-connectedness implies losing access to local
comparative statics tools in the space of preferences.
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2 Relation to existing literature
To the best of our knowledge, all work conducted on topologies for preference
spaces comes from the literature on general equilibrium. Debreu [4] proposes a
topology on the space of continuous preferences that is based on the Hausdorff
semimetric; Hildebrand [7] provides generalizations on Debreu’s work. In these
works, the space of alternatives, X , is endowed with an exogenous topology such
that any continuous preference ą can be identified with a closed subset of X ˆX .
In Debreu’s work, X is assumed to be compact, so ą is a closed compact subset
of X ˆ X . By contrast, Hildebrand assumes X to be locally compact, so ą
is compact in the one-point Alexandroff compactification of X . The objective of
these assumptions is to associate each preference with a closed subset of a compact
space; therefore, one obtains a separable space by endowing the preference space
with the Hausdorff semimetric. Because the space of preferences is given the
topology of the Hausdorff semimetric, Hildebrand calls it the topology of closed
convergence. Lastly, Kannai [8] takes the work of Debreu and analyzes the special
case when preferences are continuous and monotone.
Outside the realm of general equilibrium, Chambers, Echenique and Lambert
[3] use tools from the above literature to address the following question. Suppose
one observes a finite but large dataset generated by picking maximal elements out
of a preference ą. Can one find a preference ąˆ such that ąˆ rationalizes observed
choices and ąˆ is “close” to the true preference ą? They provide a positive answer
under the topology of closed convergence when preferences are assumed to be
locally strict (see Border and Segal [1] or Section 5 for a definition of locally strict
preference).
Our exercise differs from the previous exercises in three ways.
First, we wish to find a topology for preference spaces that is independent of
any exogenously imposed topology on X . Note that the study of topology is the
study of continuous mappings; thus, choosing a topology for a set is equivalent
to choosing a structure for continuous mappings involving the set. For decision
problems, the minimal requirement should be that optimal binary decisions are
continuous; that is, if x is strictly preferred to y and one perturbs y slightly,
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then x should remain preferred. The smallest topology with this property is the
topology generated by the upper and lower contour sets of the preference under
study. Therefore, any topology on X that makes optimal behavior continuous
will inherently depend on the preference under consideration: the topology on R2
that guarantees continuity of behavior for a lexicographic agent is fundamentally
different from the topology on R2 that guarantees continuous behavior for a Cobb-
Douglas agent. Insisting on a preference-independent topology onX and excluding
any preference that generates noncontinuous behavior with respect to such an
arbitrarily chosen topology is unnatural in the context of decision making. Section
5 argues that our approach of remaining agnostic about the topology on X is
equivalent to endowing X with the topology generated by the upper and lower
contour sets and allowing the topology on X to vary as preferences vary. In short,
assuming X is not exogenously endowed with a topology is equivalent to assuming
that all preferences are inherently continuous; some are just discontinuous relative
to additional assumptions on X .
Second, because we do not impose a topology on X , continuity imposes no disci-
pline in our model. Comparing our topology to the topology of closed convergence
highlights how the exogenous topology on X (together with the continuity restric-
tion on preferences) shapes the topology on preference spaces. For example, the
metrization aspect of preference is purely driven by the topological assumptions
on X since preference spaces are generally not Hausdorff in the absence of an ex-
ogenous topology for X . As previously discussed, this means that the topological
properties of preference spaces are driven by considerations that are not based on
the economic decisions being taken.
Finally, the topology of closed convergence is motivated by attempting to adapt
the Hausdorff semimetric for closed sets to the preference space; that demand
functions are upper hemicontinuous in preferences is proved as a theorem. Our
approach is slightly different. In our motivation, that the optimizing behavior is
continuous in preferences is part of the definition of our topology, not a result: we
want to guarantee that an economic model is continuous in preference if and only if
it is continuous in utilities, regardless of whether the Hausdorff semimetric achieves
this objective. Furthermore, preserving the structure of continuous mappings from
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utilities to behavior includes, but need not be restricted to, maximizing behavior.
For instance, if one was to write a behavioral model where agents do not fully
optimize (for example, the satisficing model in the spirit of Simon [10]) and the
model is continuous in utility functions, then our topology demands that it should
also be continuous in preferences. This result validates the methodology of looking
at utility functions as a shortcut for analyzing continuity in preferences universally
across applications, not just demand functions.
3 Model
Let X be a relevant choice space, U be the set of all utility functions on X , and P
be the set of all binary relations on X that admit a utility representation. That
is, for each ąP P, there exists a function u P U such that for all x, y P X , x ą y if
and only if upxq ą upyq. While most preference representation theorems hinge on
X being a separable topological space, Echenique and Dubra [5] characterize the
conditions under which a preference admits a utility representation in the absence
of topological assumptions on X . Let F : U Ñ P denote the mapping that
takes each utility function to the preference it represents; that is, for all x, y P X ,
upxq ą upyq if and only if xF puqy. We call mapping F the representation mapping.
Finally, let TU denote the pointwise topology on U .
1
Our goal is to find a topology on P that preserves the structure of continuous
mappings from U to any abstract set Z. If such a topology exists, then the
continuous mappings from P to Z should be in one-to-one correspondence with the
continuous mappings from U to Z. This requirement is captured by the definition
below.
Definition 1. A final topology on P is a topology TP that satisfies the following
universal property: a function g : P Ñ Z is continuous if and only if there exists
a unique continuous function h : U Ñ Z.
Graphically, the final topology on P is the topology on P that makes the diagram
in Figure 2 commute and preserves the structure of continuous mappings from util-
1We use this topology on U˚ for simplicity of our characterization. Lemma 3 and Remark 2
show how to generalize to any other topology on U˚.
9
ities to any economic variable of interest, Z. The uniqueness condition guarantees
that there is a bijection between the continuous functions g and the continuous
functions h; thus, our topology endows the preference space with exactly the same
continuous functions as admitted by the utility space.
P
U
Z
F
h
g
Figure 2: TP makes the diagram commute and preserves continuous mappings.
4 Results
In this section, we present our three theorems. We briefly describe the theorems
and follow up with formal statements. Proofs are provided in the Appendix.
4.1 All preferences
Theorem 1 shows that without any restrictions on P, topology TP must be trivial.
That is, the only open sets are the empty set and P itself. The driving force
behind this result is that total indifference, that is, the preference such that any
two alternatives are indifferent, is an element of P. To see this result intuitively,
consider any preference ąP P and any utility function that represents it, u P U . We
can always flatten u into the constant function 0 in a way that is both continuous
and preserves the underlying preference ą; that is, we can find a sequence punqnPN
such that each un represents ą and un Ñ 0. Since the representation mapping is
continuous, the total indifference (which we denote as ») belongs to the closure of
tąu. Therefore, the closure of any singleton contains the same element, ». The
only way this is possible is if the topology is trivial: total indifference is the glue
that binds the whole space together into essentially a single point.
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Theorem 1. Let TP denote the final topology on P. Then, TP “ tH,Pu.
Since total indifference is a nongeneric preference, it is natural to ask how The-
orem 1 changes when we exclude this preference from P.
4.2 All preferences except total indifference
To formally present Theorem 2, we first provide some important notation. First,
let P˚ “ Pzt»u, where » is the total indifference preferences, i.e., »“ X ˆ X .
By analogy, let U˚ “ tu P U : u is not constantu be endowed with the subspace
topology; that is, a set G is open in U˚ if G “ G0 X U
˚, where G0 is an open
set in U . In what follows, let TP˚ denote the final topology on P
˚ relative to U˚.
Moreover, let A Ă X be any finite set and ąP P˚ be such that for all x, y P A either
x ą y or y ą x, i.e., x  y. Then, let Bpą, Aq “ tąˆ : p@x, y P Aq x ą y ô xąˆyu.
The set Bpą, Aq consists of all preferences that agree with ą on the finite set A
of strictly ranked alternatives.
Once we exclude total indifference from the set of preferences, Lemma 3 and
Theorem 2 characterize a basis for TP . Indeed, each set Bpą, Aq is a basis ele-
ment; thus, spanning all combinations pą, Aq generates a basis for TP˚. However,
this topology is not Hausdorff. Furthermore, Proposition 1 shows that unless we
consider only strict preferences, that is, preferences where no two alternatives are
indifferent, TP can never be Hausdorff. Since, as argued in Section 1, the Hausdorff
property is an intuitive property to ask for, we further restrict attention to strict
preferences.
Lemma 3 proves that F is an open map independent of the topology imposed
for U . As such, one can characterize the basis elements of P˚ by pushing forward
the basis elements of U˚. Thus, we obtain a clear characterization for P˚.
Theorem 2. Let B “ tBpą, Aq :ąP P˚, A is finiteu. Then, B is a basis for TP˚.
Two corollaries follow from Theorem 2. First, if X has at least three elements,
then T ˚P is not Hausdorff. To illustrate this result, take any triplet of points
x, y, z P X and consider a preference ąP U˚ such that x ą y ą w. Consider any
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u P F´1pąq and construct the following transformations:
unpzq “
$’’’&
’’’%
upzq y Á z
upyq ` 1
n
upzq x ą z ą y
upzq z Á x
Note that F punq “ą for each n and that F plimtunuq “ ąˆ ‰ą. By the continuity
of F , this means ąˆ P tąu, where tąu denotes the closure of the singleton tąu.
Hence, singletons are not sequentially closed, implying P˚ is not Hausdorff.
Second, provided that X has at least three elements, P˚ is connected. This
result is easily demonstrated by contradiction. Suppose G1 and G2 disconnect
P˚. Then, for some collections pąi, txi, yiuqiPI and pąj , txj , yjuqjPJ , we have G1 “
YiBpąi, txi, yiuq and G2YjBpąj , txj , yjuq; without loss of generality, assume that
xi ąi yi and xj ąj yj for all i P I and j P J . Assume that there exist i P I and
j P J such that txi, yiu ‰ txj , yju. Construct ą as follows: for all z R txi, yixj , yju,
xi ą yi, xj ą yj, and z „ yj. Then, ąP G1 X G2, a contradiction. Hence,
G1 “ Bpą1, tx, yuq for some pą1, tx, yuq and G2 “ Bpą2, tx, yuq for some ą2 such
that ą1 |tx, yu ‰ą2 |tx, yu. Consider ąˆ defined as follows: for all z, z
1 ‰ x, y;
z1„ˆząˆx „ y. Then, ąˆ R G1 YG2, a contradiction. Thus, there cannot be sets G1
and G2 that disconnect P
˚.
Lemma 7 shows a stronger result: U˚ is path-connected when X has at least
three elements. Since P˚ “ F pU˚q and F is continuous, P˚ is path-connected. As
discussed in Section 1, this is an important property of the preference space.
4.3 Strict preferences only
Theorem 3 shows that in the subspace of strict preferences, the topology identi-
fied in Theorem 2 is Hausdorff but totally path-disconnected. Thus, Theorem 3
presents a fundamental trade-off. While it is natural to consider nonstrict prefer-
ences, this implies that any topology that universally preserves continuous map-
pings cannot be Hausdorff; conversely, while the Hausdorff property is a natural
property to ask of a topology, it comes at the cost of considering only strict prefer-
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ence spaces. A consequence of these observations is that topological conditions on
preference spaces carry substantive behavioral assumptions about the indifference
structures allowed in the preference space.
As before, to formally present Theorem 3, we provide some useful notation.
Formally, let Ps “ tąP P : p@x, y P Xq x  yu and Us “ tu P U : p@x, y P
Xq upxq ‰ upyqu. Analogously, we let TP s denote the final topology on P
s relative
to Us.
Proposition 1. Assume Ps ‰ H. Let P0 be Hausdorff and Ps Ă P0. Then,
P0 “ Ps.
Proposition 1 shows that the set of strict preferences is the largest set of prefer-
ences that is both Hausdorff and includes all strict preferences. This characteristic
is what motivates the restriction of P˚ to Ps.
Theorem 3. Let B “ tBpą, Aq :ąP Ps, A is finiteu. Then, B is a basis for TP s.
Interestingly, the basis for TP s is the same as that for TP˚; however, by excluding
indifferences from the set of possible preferences, we can show that Ps is Hausdorff,
but we lose connectedness. To see that Ps is Hausdorff, consider any preference
ąP Ps and let ą´1 be the opposite preference. That is, for all x, y P X , x ą y ô
y ą´1 x. Note that ą´1P P˚; therefore, this preference is well defined. Then,
P˚ztąu “ Yx,yPXBpą
´1, tx, yuq: indeed, if ąˆ P P˚ztąu, it must disagree with
ą on some pair tx, yu and, thus, must agree with ą´1 on pair tx, yu. Since each
Bpą´1, tx, yuq is open, the complement of tąu relative to Ps is open, showing that
the singletons are closed.
However, Ps fails to be path-connected. This is in contrast to P˚, which fails to
be Hausdorff but is path-connected. To see why Ps is not connected, consider any
preference ą and any pair x, y P X . Then, we can write X “ Bpą, tx, yuqYBpą´1
, tx, yuq. Thus, we can express X as a disjoint union of two proper open sets,
showing that X is disconnected. Lemma 8 provides a stronger result: Ps is totally
path-disconnected. An easy way to see this is to assume that X is finite: as
mentioned in the previous section, when X is finite, Ps is a discreet space in the
sense that the singletons are open. Therefore, Ps is totally path-disconnected.
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5 Imposing topologies on X
Section 4 presents results that do not presume any topology on the space of out-
comes, Z, nor on the space of alternatives, X , because we are interested in pro-
viding a universal methodology under which continuity in utilities is equivalent to
continuity in preferences. Theorems 1 and 2 suggest that any such topology fails
to be Hausdorff at this level of generality. This result motivates Theorem 3 and
the study of Ps. However, one may ask if imposing topological assumptions on X
might yield a topology on P or P˚ that is Hausdorff, thus eliminating the need to
restrict attention to Ps.
There are two routes to consider for imposing a topology on X . First, one can
assume X comes endowed with an exogenously given topology; for example, if
X “ R2, one may endow X with the topology induced by the Euclidean distance.
Then, to guarantee that utility representations exist, one restricts attention to
preferences that are continuous with respect to the given topology on X , that
is, preferences such that the upper and lower contour sets are open sets in the
topology of X . Alternatively, one may assume X does not have an exogenously
given topology and, instead, impose that for each ąP P, the topology on X is the
topology generated by the upper and lower contour sets. This approach generates
a family of topological spaces, pX, TXpąqqąPP , where TXpąq is the topology on X
generated by the upper and lower contour sets.
In what follows, we analyze the final topology on P˚ when we do and do not
endow X with an exogenous topology.
5.1 Endowing X with an exogenous topology, TX
Since none of our results relied on a topology for X , the final topology on X is
still the one defined in Theorem 2, and the space is still totally connected but not
Hausdorff. However, assuming that X is endowed with an exogenous topology TX
restores the Hausdorff property for a strict superset of Ps. Indeed, in line with
Border and Segal [1], we say a preference, ą, is locally strict if, for every pair
px, yq P X such that x „ y we can find a pair that is arbitrarily close to px, yq,
where the ranking is strict. Formally, we have Definition 3 below.
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Definition 2. Let pX, TXq be a topological space, and let P be the set of all pref-
erences defined on X that admit a utility representation. We say ąP P is locally
strict if the following holds: for each px, yq P X ˆX such that x Á y and for every
neighborhood V of px, yq, there exists px1, y1q P V such that x1 ą y1.
Remark 1. Note that the definition of locally strict preference is effective only
when x „ y. Otherwise, x1 “ x and y1 “ y always satisfy the definition. Further-
more, since » is clearly not locally strict, the set of locally strict preferences is a
subset of P˚.
Moreover, as previously mentioned, one should further restrict attention to con-
tinuous preferences; that is, preferences whose upper and lower contour sets are
open in TX . This ensures that utility representations exist. For concreteness, we
define continuity below.
Definition 3. Let pX, TXq be a topological space, and let ą be a preference on X.
We say ą is continuous if for all y P X the following are true:
1.- tx : y ą xu is open in TX .
2.- tx : x ą yu is open in TX
We denote the set of continuous and locally strict preferences as Pcls
Theorem 4 shows that the space of continuous and locally strict preferences is
indeed Hausdorff. Proposition 1 showcases the connection between the topologi-
cal properties of preference spaces and the economic assumptions we make about
indifference: concretely, the Hausdorff property is incompatible with nonstrict
preferences. Theorem 4 reinterprets that result: Theorem 4 showcases the connec-
tions between the topological properties of the alternatives space, the topological
properties of preference spaces, and the economic assumptions we make about in-
difference. As before, the Hausdorff property holds for a preference space as long
as the preference is strict, but only in a local sense. Clearly, the exact meaning of
“local” is given by the topology the researcher imposes on X : preferences that are
locally strict in one topology might not be locally strict in another topology. One
may worry that the topological properties of P˚ might depend excessively on the
arbitrary topology imposed on X , which motivates the results in the next section.
Theorem 4. The space Pcls is Hausdorff.
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5.2 Endowing X with the topology TXpąq for each ąP P
˚
Contrary to the results in the previous subsection, one may not want to impose
an exogenous topology on X . In contrast to the topology generated by lower and
upper contour sets, exogenous topologies on X have no economic meaning because
they are unrelated to any economic decision. However, if we consider the topology
on X induced by the upper and lower contour sets, then this topology is intimately
tied to the decision maker’s economic decisions. Indeed, if ą is a preference and
TXpąq is the topology generated by ą, this topology has a clear economic inter-
pretation: a sequence of alternatives pxnqnPN approximates an alternative x if any
time x is worse than some z but better than some z1. Then, eventually xn is
also worse than z and better than z1. Formally, for all alternatives z, z1 such that
z ą x ą z1, the sequence pxnqnPN eventually satisfies z ą xn ą z
1. Topologies
TX that are independent of preferences have no such economic interpretation; in
contrast, topology TXpąq has economic meaning since it depends only on how the
decision maker perceives the alternatives, and it makes optimal behavior contin-
uous. For example, a consumer choosing a bundle in R2 who perceives the goods
as perfect substitutes has discontinuous demand selections if we impose the Eu-
clidean topology on R2; however, the discontinuity disappears if we endow X with
the topology generated by upper and lower contour sets.
To expand upon the above discussion, consider the following two examples. First,
a consumer has to choose amongst bundles of two goods, so X “ R2. This con-
sumer has a satiation point such that consuming more than 10 units of either good
produces no additional wellbeing. If we endow R2 with the Euclidean distance,
then x “ px1, x2q “ p10, 10q and y “ py1, y2q “ p1000, 1000q are “far away”. How-
ever, from the decision maker’s perspective, these two points are indeed very close
since consuming px1, x2q or consuming py1, y2q is indifferent. The large distance
between bundle x and bundle y is driven purely by an assumption with no connec-
tions to the decision maker’s economic problem. Second, consider a person with
preferences over money. Presumably, for this person, more money is better, and a
thousand dollars is very far from a million dollars. However, if a thousand dollars
is the minimal expenditure required to hit the consumer’s satiation point (for ex-
ample, bundle p10, 10q in the first example), then any amount of money above a
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thousand dollars is not intrinsically far from the thousand dollars itself. Whether
a million dollars and a thousand dollars are close or far should not depend on the
whims of arithmetic but, rather, on what satisfaction a consumer can obtain from
the additional money. 2
In short, this section states that all preferences are inherently continuous; some
just happen to be discontinuous with respect to an exogenously given topology.
Informally, Proposition 4 shows that the space Pcls is not Hausdorff, implying
that imposing an exogenous topology on X (as we did in the previous section) is
a necessary and sufficient condition for recovering the Hausdorff property on Pcls.
The proof relies on Lemma 9: every preference that is not totally indifferent is
locally strict when X is endowed with the topology generated by the upper and
lower contour sets. Thus, the same construction we used to show that U˚ is not
Hausdorff applies.
Proposition 2. Let Pcls˚ “ tą:ą is locally strict when X has topology TXpąqu.
Then, Pcls˚ is not Hausdorff in the final topology.
This result shows that the trade-off between the Hausdorff property and path-
connectedness is unavoidable if the only topological assumption on X is that X
is endowed with the topology TXpąq for each ą P P. As mentioned in the intro-
duction, there is a fundamental trade-off between methodological generality, the
intuitive properties of the topology on preferences, and the structure of indifference
curves. While it is natural to dismiss the topological properties of P as a mere tech-
nicality, this paper shows that topological properties on the preference space have
strong connections to relevant economic problems. Path-connectedness is relevant
for comparative statics exercises, but it is incompatible with the Hausdorff prop-
erty, which is a natural property for most economic applications. Furthermore,
the Hausdorff property is incompatible with non-singleton indifference curves.
2To further drive the point, consider a decision maker that must choose two lotteries that
pay off an amount between ´1 and 1; that is, X “ ∆pr´1, 1sq. Suppose we endow X with an
Lp norm. Then, the two lotteries l, q P X may be close or far away depending on the value of p
we choose, which is an ad hoc decision that disregards the only economic consideration in this
problem: how does the decision maker rank the lotteries in X . This problem is avoided if one
simply declares that the open sets are those generated by the upper and lower contour sets of
the decision maker’s preferences.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Definition 4. The Sierpin´ski space is the topological space defined by S “ pt0, 1u, tH, t1u, t0, 1uuq.
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Lemma 1. Let Z be any topological space. If g : P Ñ Z is continuous, then g is
constant.
Proof. Let Z be any topological space and g : P Ñ Z be continuous. Let h :
U Ñ Z be defined by h “ pg ˝ F q. Let ąP P be any preference, u P F´1pąq
be such that }u} ă 1, and un “
1
n
u for each n P N. Such representations always
exists because } arctanp¨q} ď 1 and arctan is strictly increasing. By the universal
property of T , continuity of g implies continuity of h. Therefore, gp„q “ hp0q “
hplimnÑ8tunuq “ hpuq “ gpąq, where 0 is the constant function taking value 0.
The third equality follows from F punq “ F puq (so that hpunq “ hpuq for each n).
Since ą was arbitrarily selected this proves that g is constant.
The following proposition shows that, regardless of the topology imposed on U ,
P has the trivial topology. Key to this result is that „P P and tąu for each ąP P.
Theorem 5. Let TP denote the final topology on P. Then, TP “ tH,Pu
Proof. Let S be the Sierpin´ski space and g : P Ñ S be continuous. By Lemma 1,
g is constant. Thus, there exists exactly two continuous functions from P to S:
the function that takes value 1 always, and the function that takes value 0 always.
Hence, TP “ tH,Pu.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2 and connectedness results.
The next lemma characterizes the open sets in P as a function of the open sets in
U . While continuity of F implies that F´1pGq is open in U for each open G Ă P,
the converse is generally not true. However, the universal property on T implies
that the converse is true for the final topology.
Lemma 2. For each G Ă P, if F´1pGq is open, then G is open.
Proof. Let S “ pt0, 1u, tH, t0, 1u, t1uuq be the Sierpin`ski space. Fix G Ă P. Define
ρ : P Ñ S as ρpGAq “ 0, ρpGq “ 1. Define h : U Ñ S as hpuq “ 0 when u P F´1pGAq
and F puq “ 1 for all u P F´1pGq. Note that h “ ρ ˝ F . By the universal property
defining T , ρ is continuous iff h is continuous. Since h´1p1q “ F´1pGq and F´1pGq
is open in U by assumption, then h is continuous. Thus, ρ is continuous. Hence,
ρ´1p1q “ G is open.
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We now show that F is an open map; that is, F pGq is open whenever G is
open. We provide two proofs of this result. The first proof is in Lemma 3 and
does not rely on the topology of U˚, while the second one does. For Lemma 3
we use the following notation: ˝ denotes the operation of function composition,
and SympU˚q is the symmetry group of U˚, that is, the set of permutations on
U˚ endowed with the operation of function composition). The intuition behind
the proof of Lemma 3 is that P˚ is the quotient of U under the group action that
associates each u P U˚ with the set of utility functions that represent F puq. It is
well known that the projection on the quotient via a continuous group action is
an open map, so F is an open map.
Lemma 3. Let G be an open set in U˚. Then, F pGq is open.
Proof. Let A be the set of increasing functions from R to R that are continuous in
the standard topology ofR. concretely, A “ tff : RÑ Rf is continuous and strictly increasingu.
Then pA, ˝q is a group that acts continuously on U˚ in the following way: a : AÑ
SympU˚q is defined as apfqpuq “ pf ˝ uq. Since each strictly increasing function
has a strictly increasing inverse, then a is well defined. Also, for each f P A,
apfqpuq “ v if, and only if, F puq “ F pvq. Now let G be an open set in U˚. Then,
by Lemma 2 F pGq is open if, and only if, F´1pF pGqq is open, so it only remains
to show that F´1pF pGqq is open. Notice that F´1pF pGqq “ YfPAapGq. Since a
is bi-continuous and G is open, then apGq is open for each G, making F´1pF pGqq
open.
Remark 2. Because F is open then we can characterize the topology on P˚ via
it’s basis elements. Indeed, if D is a basis for the topology on U˚ then F pDq is a
basis for the topology on P˚. When U˚ is endowed with the topology of pointwise
convergence (arguably, the most commonly used topology for applications), then
this basis is easy to characterize explicitly. The next lemmas do that.
For the next lemma we use the following notation: if A Ă X and ąP P˚ we use
ą |A to denote the restriction of ą to A. Formally, ą |A “ą XpAˆ Aq.
Lemma 4. Let ąP P˚ and A Ă X be a finite set such that for all x, y P A x  y.
Then, Bpą, Aq “ tąˆ : ąˆ|A “ą |Au is open.
20
Proof. Let ą and A be as in the statement of the lemma. First, consider the case
A “ H. Then, for all ąˆ P P we obtain ąˆ|A “ H “ą |A. Therefore Bpą, Aq “ P˚,
which is open. Next, consider A “ txu Ă X . Then, x  x, a contradiction. Thus,
without loss of generality, |A| ě 2. By Lemma 2, we need to show that F´1pBpą
, Aqq is open. Let u P F´1pBpą, Aqq. Let ε “ mint|upxq ´ upyq| : x, y P Au ą 0.
This is well defined since A is finite. Then, Bpu, ε
2
q Ă F´1pBpą, Aqq, where Bpu, ε
2
q
is the ball of center u and radius ε
2
. Thus, F´1pBpą, Aqq is open.
For the following Lemma, let D be basis of intervals for TU˚. That is, D P D if,
and only if, the following holds: there exists a finite set of elements x1, ..., xN P X
and a finite set of intervals I1, ..., IN Ă R such that for all u P D
˚, upxnq P In for
each n P t1, ..., Nu.
Lemma 5. Let D P D˚. Then F pDq is open. That is, F pDq P TP˚.
Proof. Let D be as in the statement of the Lemma, and tx1, ..., xNu, tI1, ...INu
be the corresponding points in X and intervals in R. The proof is divided in two
cases.
Case 1: Assume that XNn“1In “ H. Then, there is a subset T Ă t1, ..., Nu such
that In X Ik “ H for all n, k P T . Indeed, let In “ pan, bnq for each n. Let
a¯ “ maxtan : 1 ď n ď Nu, and b “ mintbn : 1 ď n ď Nu. Then, a¯ ě b, else
each z P pa¯, bq satisfies z P XIn, a contradiction. Thus, at least two intervals
are disjoint. Let A “ txt : t P T u. Then, for all u, v P D and all x, x
1 P A,
upxq ą upx1q ô vpxq ą vpx1q. Without loss of generality enumerate the set
A “ txt : t P T u in a monotone increasing way. That is, for all u P D, if k ą n
then upxkq ą upxnq. Then, F pDq “ tąP P : p@ k, n P T q k ą n ñ xk ą xnu.
Thus, Lemma 4 implies F pDq is open.
Case 2: Assume that Xn “ 1
NIn ‰ H. Then, F pDq “ P
˚. Indeed, let ąP P˚
and u P U be a representation of ą. Let I “ Xn “ 1
NIn. Then, without loss of
generality upxq P I for each x P X . Thus, u P D. Hence, ą“ F puq P F pDq. To
conclude, because P P TP and F pDq “ P then F pDq P TP .
Lemma 6. Let F : U˚ Ñ P˚ be the representation map. Then, F is open.
Proof. Let V be open in U˚; that is, V P TU˚ . Then, there exists a family of
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sets tDi : i P Iu such that V “ YiDi, where I is an arbitrary index set. Then,
F pV q “ YiF pDiq. Lemma 5 shows that F pDiq is open for each i, thus F pV q is
open. This shows that F is an open map.
For the next Lemma, we use the following notation: Bpą, Aq “ tąˆ : ąˆ | A “ą
|Au, where A Ă X is a finite set, and ąP P such that, for all x, y P A, x ‰ y.
Theorem 6. Let B “ tBpą, Aq :ąP P˚, A is finiteu. Then, B is a basis for TP˚.
Proof. By Lemmas 3 and 6, the image of D via F is a basis for TP˚ . Since
F pDq “ B, then B is a basis for TP˚.
For the next lemma, we use the following notation. Let u P U and x P X ; we use
u´x to denote the restriction of u to Xztxu. That is, u´x : Xztxu Ñ X . Similarly,
if r P R, then pr, u´xq denote the function v : X Ñ R defined by vpxq “ r and
vpyq “ upyq for y ‰ x. Lastly, if r P R, we use boldface to denote the constant
funtion r: rpxq “ r for each x P X . This is the analogous notation one uses for
finitely dimensional vectors, and is convenient for out purposes.
Lemma 7. Assume X has at least three elements. Then, U˚ is path connected.
Proof. Let u, v P U˚. Pick x, y P X such that the following hold:
1.- upxq ‰ upyq,
2.- pDc P Xq such that vpxq ‰ vpcq, and c ‰ y
Such x, y exist because #X ě 3. We will continuously transform u into v, showing
that U˚ is not only connected, but path-connected. We proceed in three steps.
Step 1: For each s P r0, 1s define t as follows
t1psqpzq “
$’’’&
’’’%
upxq z “ x
p1´ squpzq ` svpzq z ‰ x, y
upyq z “ y
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We must check that for each s P r0, 1s, t1psq is a non-constant function (i.e.,
t1psq P U
˚). Indeed, t1p0q “ u P U
˚, t1psqpxq “ upxq ‰ upyq “ t1psqpyq for s ą 0.
Let w1 ” t1p1q.
Step 2: For each s P r0, 1s define t2 as follows
t2psqpzq “
$’’’&
’’’%
p1´ squpxq ` svpxq z “ x
w1pzq z ‰ x, y
p1´ squpyq ` svpxq z “ y
We must check that for each s P r0, 1s, t2psq is a non-constant function (i.e.,
t2psq P U
˚). Indeed, t2p0q “ w1 P U
˚. Moreover, t2p1qpzq “ vpzq if z ‰ y and
t2p1qpyq “ vpxq. Since vpcq ‰ vpxq then t2p1q P U
˚. Finally, if t2psqp¨q was a
constant function for some s P p0, 1q then t2psqpxq “ t2psqpyq. Thus, p1´ squpxq `
svpxq “ p1´ squpyq` svpxq ô upxq “ upyq, a contradiction. Thus, t2p1q P U
˚. Let
w2 ” t2p1q.
Step 3: For each s P r0, 1s define t as follows
t3psqpzq “
$&
%
w2pzq z ‰ y
p1´ sqw2pzq ` svpzq z “ y
We must check that for each s P r0, 1s, t3psq is a non-constant function (i.e.,
t3psq P U
˚). Indeed, t3p0q “ w2 P U
˚. Moreover, t3p1q “ v P U
˚. Finally, assume
t3psq was constant for some s P p0, 1q. Then, t3psqpyq “ t3psqpxq “ t3psqpcq, so
p1 ´ sqvpxq ` svpyq “ vpxq “ vpcq ô vpxq “ vpyq “ vpcq, a contradiction. Thus,
t3psq P U
˚ for all s.
Combining steps 1, 2, and 3 generates a continuous transformation of u to v
withing U˚, and this concludes the proof.
Remark 3. Suppose X “ tx, yu; then U˚ “ tpux, uyq P R
2 : ux ‰ uyu. Define
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Gx “ tpux, uyq P R : ux ą uyu and Gy “ tpux, uyq P R : uy ą uxu. Then, Gx and
Gy disconnect U
˚.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3 and Proposition 1
Theorem 7. Let B “ tBpą, Aq :ąP Ps, A is finiteu. Then, B is a basis for TP s.
Proof. The proof of Theorem 2 applies verbatim, since that proof never used that
preferences where not strict. Indeed, the proof of Theorem 2 relies on » being
excluded from P, which is still true in this case.
Lemma 8. Ps is totally path disconnected.
Proof. It suffices to show that Us is totally path disconnected. Take u, v P Us
be distinct functions. Assume there is a path t joining u and v. That is, t :
S Ñ Us with tp0q “ u, tp1q “ v and t continuous. Since u ‰ v there are points
x, y P X such that upxq ą upyq and vpyq ą vpxq. Let ∆psq “ tpsqpxq ´ tpsqpyq.
Then, ∆p0q ą 0 ą ∆p1q. Thus, there is a point s˚ such that ∆ps˚q “ 0. Then,
tps˚qpxq “ tps˚qpyq, contradicting that tps˚q P Us. Thus, no two distinct functions
are path-connected.
Proposition 3. Assume Ps ‰ H. Let P0 be Hausdorff and Ps Ă P0. Then,
P0 “ Ps.
Proof. Assume not. Then, P0 is Hausdorff and there exists ąP P0zPs. Let x, y P
X such that x „ y. Such points must exists because ąR Ps and assume that this
is the only instance of indifference. This assumption is without loss of generality.3
Furthermore, let A “ tz : x „ z „ y z ‰ x, z ‰ yu. If A ‰ H, let v : A Ñ r0, 1s
be a strict ranking of the points in A. That is, p@a, b P Aq, vpaq ‰ vpbq. Let u
3The construction below can trivially be replicated for all pairs px, yq such that x „ y by
looking at the quotient of X ˆX relative to indifference. Let ă x ą represent the indifference
class of x. For each class ă x ą that is not a singleton, pick two representatives, x, y, and carry
out the construction below.
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represent ą. For each n P N, define the following utility functions:
unpzq “
$’’’&
’’’%
upzq ´ 2
n
x ą z or z “ x
upzq ` 2
n
z ą y or z “ y
upxq ` vpzq z P A
Notice the following: un P P
s Ă P0 for all n, un Ñ u, F pu1q “ F punq for all
n P N, and F pą1q ‰ą. Thus, ąP tF pu1qu, thus violating that P
0 is Hausdorff.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 4
Theorem 8. The space Pcls is Hausdorff.
Proof. Assume ą is locally constant and continuous. Assume, by way of contra-
diction, that ąˆ P tąu, ąˆ ‰ą. Then, ąˆ “ limnÑ8 ąn, where ą1“ą2“ ... “ą. By
Theorem 2, this means that if yąˆx then y ą x. Thus, ąˆ ‰ą mens that there exits
a pair px, yq P X ˆ X such that x ą y and x„ˆy. Because ą is continuous this
means there are neighborhoods Vx of x and Vy of y such that x
1 ą y1 for all x1 P Vx
and y1 P Vy. Furthermore, because ąˆ is locally strict and xÁˆy, then there exists
x2 P Vx and y
2inVy such that y
2 ą x2. Because ąnÑ ąˆ, y
2ąˆx2 implies y2 ą x2.
However, this contradicts that x1 ą y1 for all x1 P Vx and y
1 P Vy.
Lemma 9. Let ąP P˚. Then, ą˚ is locally strict in pX, TXpą
˚qq.
Proof. Let px, yq P X be such that x Á y. If x ą y then the locally strict property
hold vacuously. Assume then that x „ y. Then, there wither exists z such that
z ą x or there exists z1 such that y ą z1, or both. Otherwise, for each z the
following holds: x Á z Á y „ x, implying that ąR P˚, a contradiction. Then,
let V be a neighborhood of px, yq. Then, there is a basis element A P TXpąq
and a basis element B P TXpąq such that px, yq P A ˆ B Ă V . By definition of
basis elements, there exists z P A and z1 P B such that z ą x and y ą z1. Thus,
pz, z1q P V and z ą z1, proving that ą is locally strict.
Proposition 4. Let Pcls˚ “ tą:ą is locally strict when X has topology TXpąqu.
Then, Pcls˚ is not Hausdorff in the final topology.
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Proof. Because U˚ is not Hausdorff, then ąˆ P tąu for distinct preferences ą, ąˆ P
P˚. Furthermore, Lemma 9 implies ąˆ is locally strict in pX, TXpąˆqq and ą is
locally strict in pX, TXpąqq. Thus, ą, ąˆ P P
cls˚, thus concluding the proof.
26
